A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, varying intensities in the preference for one outcome over the other, and the option to declare neutrality in order to avoid disagreement. We uncover a variant on the "tyranny of the majority": there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under very general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. This equilibrium displays a "tyranny of the minority": it is always true that the increased aggression of the minority more than compensates for smaller number, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative. In all cases the option to remain neutral ensures that the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one (as group size changes), regardless of the supermajority value needed for agreement, as long as it is not unanimity.
Introduction
In many situations, a group of individuals must decide between alternative courses of action, in a context where disagreement (not implementing a choice at all) is the worst possible outcome for all concerned. A government may need to formulate a longrun response to terrorism: individuals may (strongly) disagree over the nature of an appropriate response, but everyone would deplore complete inaction. An academic department may need to make an offer to one of several candidates. Again, individuals differ in their relative preferences but no one wants to see their slot taken away by the Dean because they couldn't agree on an offer. Jury members in the process of deliberation may disagree on whether or not the defendent is guilty; however, in most cases they all prefer to reach an agreement than to drag the deliberations on endlessly. And of course, the bargaining literature presents a plethora of examples in which non-agreement is universally regarded as a bad outcome.
The goal of this paper is to study a particular formulation of group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement, one which we believe to be representative of many real-world scenarios. 1 We proceed as follows.
A group of n agents must make a joint choice from a set of two alternatives. Each agent must either name an alternative -A or B -or she can declare "neutrality", in that she agrees to be counted, in principle, for either side. Once this is accomplished, we tally declarations for each alternative, including the number of neutral announcements. If, for an alternative, the resulting total is no less than some exogenously given supermajority, we shall call that alternative eligible.
Because neutral annoucements are allowed for and tallied on both sides, all sorts of combinations are possible: exactly one alternative may be eligible, or both, or neither. If exactly one alternative is eligible, that alternative is implemented. If both are eligibleas will typically be the case when there are a large number of neutrals -one alternative is picked and implemented at random. If neither is eligible -which will happen if there is a fierce battle to protect one's favorite alternative -then no alternative is picked: the outcome is disagreement.
The objective of the paper is to set up this model and study its equilibria. Several features of the model deserve comment. First, while the specific formulation is cast in terms of a voting model, we do not necessarily have voting in mind. The exogenously given supermajority may or may not amount to full consensus or unanimity, and in any case is to be interpreted as some preassigned degree of consensus that the group needs to achieve.
Second, the neutrality announcement is a novel feature of our model. Neutrality can be interpreted in several ways.
• Approval voting. In our example of an Economics department deciding on a chair, approval voting would mean that each faculty member is asked to submit the name or names of those candidates, which he thinks are capable of acting as chair, and that candidate which reaches some supermajority of the votes is elected chair.
In this example, a voter who approves both candidates is effectively declaring neutrality.
• Informal group decision-making. As we mentioned above, our model need not apply only to formal voting institutions. What we also have in mind are everyday situations in which a collective of individuals need to decide between two alternatives. In such situations it is often the case that some individuals, who do not feel strongly towards either alternative, declare that they will go along with any alternative that is picked by the others.
• Black box/Reduced form. One could imagine several informal mechanisms that help individuals to avoid disagreement by allowing their vote to be counted in a way that ensures a win to one of the alternatives. For example, one could delegate his ballot to an impartial arbitrator, who appreciates the anxiety of all concerned to avoid disagreement, and is therefore interested in implementing some outcome. Therefore, one could interpret the neutrality declaration as the reduced form of some unspecified procedure, which is used to help avoid unnecessary disagreements.
Third, we are interested in the "intensity" of preference for one alternative over the other, and how this enters into the decision to be neutral, or to fight for one's favorite outcome. Specifically, we permit each person's valuations to be independent (and private) draws from a distribution, and allow quite generally for varying cardinal degrees of preference. A corollary of this formulation is that others are not quite sure of how strongly a particular individual might feel about an outcome and therefore about how that individual might behave. This is one way in which uncertainty enters the model.
Uncertainty also plays an additional role, in that no one is sure how many people favor one given alternative over the other. To be sure, we assume that there is a common prior -represented by an independent probability p -that an individual will favor one alternative (call it A) over the other (call it B). Without loss of generality take p ≤ 1/2. If, in fact, p < 1/2, one might say that it is commonly known that people of "type A" are in a minority, or more precisely in a stochastic minority.
We will see that these two types of uncertainty are very important for the results we obtain.
A major goal of the paper is to study equilibria that "favor" one side: either the minority or the majority. It is intuitive -and we develop this formally in the analysis -that in any equilibrium, each individual will use a cutoff rule: there will exist some critical relative intensity of preference (for A over B or vice versa) such that the individual will announce her favorite outcome if intensities exceed this threshold, and neutrality otherwise. If the cutoff is lower, then a type may be viewed as being more "aggressive": she announces her own favorite outcome more easily (and risks disagreement with greater probability). Thus, equilibria in which an individual of the majority type uses a lower cutoff than an individual of the minority type may be viewed as favoring the majority: we call them majority equilibria. Likewise, equilibria in which the minority type uses a lower cutoff will be called minority equilibria.
One might use a parallel from the Battle of the Sexes (after all, in some sense, our model is an enriched version of that game) to search for particular majority or minority equilibria. For instance, might one not be able to sustain an equilibrium in which all members of a particular type are "fully aggressive" (using the lowest possible cutoff) while their opponents all timidly declare neutrality, regardless of valuation? The answer is that such a configuration is indeed an equilibrium. But, as we argue in detail in Section 3.2.2, this equilibrium fails a weak robustness or stability criterion. If the compatriots of, say, a type-A individual do announce neutrality for a huge range of relative valuations (rather than the entire range), it will push an individual type-A person to announce A for a large range of valuations, thus rendering the "perfect neutrality" cutoff unstable to the tiniest perturbations. As we shall see in Section 3.2.2 , uncertainty about group sizes plays a central and indispensable role in this result, though this is not the only indispensable role played by uncertainty in this model.
Nevertheless, Proposition 1 establishes that a majority equilibrium -one satisfying the robustness criterion just described -always exists. In this equilibrium, both sides use "interior" cutoffs, but the majority uses a more aggressive cutoff than the minority. This is an interesting manifestation of the "tyranny of the majority". Not only are the majority greater in number (or at least stochastically so), they are also more vocal in expressing their opinion. In response -and fearing disagreement -the minority are more cowed towards neutrality. So in majority equilibrium, group outcomes are doubly shifted towards the majority view, once through numbers, and once through greater voice.
We then turn to minority equilibria. Given the refinement described two paragraphs ago, such equilibria do not generally exist; indeed, it is easy enough to find examples of nonexistence. Yet Proposition 2 establishes the following result: if the required supermajority µ is not unanimity (i.e., µ < 1), and if the size of the stochastic minority p exceeds 1 − µ, then for all sufficiently large population sizes, a minority equilibrium must exist.
How large is large? To be sure, the answer must depend on the model specifics, but our computations suggest that in reasonable cases, population sizes of 8-10 (certainly less than the size of a jury!) are enough for existence. We found this result remarkable, though we confess that we do not understand it fully. In part, it is intuitive. As population size increases, the two types of uncertainty that we described -uncertainty about type and uncertainty regarding valuation intensity -tend to diminish under the strength of the Law of Large Numbers. This would do no good if p < 1 − µ, for then the minority would neither be able to win, nor would it be able to block the majority. [Indeed, Proposition 5 in Section 6.2 shows that if p < 1 − µ, then for large population sizes a minority equilibrium cannot exist.] But if p exceeds 1 − µ, the minority acquires "credibility" to block the wishes of the majority, or at least does so when the population is large enough.
For two reasons, however, this notion of "credible blocking" does not form a complete explanation. First, credible blocking is not tantamount to a credible win. Indeed, it is easy to see that as µ goes up, the minority find it easier to block but also harder to win. So the previous result must not be viewed as an assertion that the minority is "better protected" by an increase in µ. As the example in Section 6.2 makes clear, this is not true. Nevertheless, insofar as existence is concerned, the fact that p > 1 − µ > 0 guarantees existence for large population sizes.
Second, the case of unanimity remains open. The techniques used to prove Proposition 2 do not work in that case, and indeed we conjecture that the result is false. That is, we claim that one can write down a group decision model with unanimity in which a minority equilibrium never exists, no matter what the population size is. We report on this conjecture in Section 6.2. So blocking credibility alone does not translate into the existence of a minority equilibrium in the unanimity case.
The next main result in the paper studies minority equilibrium. Recall that in the majority equilibrium, the majority group will have a greater chance of implementing its preferred outcome on two counts: greater voice, and greater number. Obviously, this synergy is reversed for the minority equilibrium: there, the minority have greater voice, yet they have smaller numbers. One might expect the net effect of these two forces to result in some ambiguity. The intriguing content of Proposition 3 is that in a minority equilibrium, the minority must always implement its favorite action with greater probability than the majority. Voice more than compensates for number.
Our paper thus suggests that in group decision-making the outcomes tend to be invariably biased in one direction or another. In majority equilibrium this is obvious. But it is also true of minority equilibrium. This lends some support to the view that group decision-making tends to have an extreme character of its own, something that this model does share (but for subtler reasons) with the Battle of the Sexes.
One might criticize Proposition 3 on the grounds that it may be empty. Minority equilibrium typically exist for large population sizes, but for such equilibria the probability of disagreement should be very large or approaching unity. [For instance, suppose that µ is very close to unity. Wouldn't all outcomes be blocked?] Of course, this sort of argumentation neglects the strategic nature of decision-making in this model. Individual cutoffs vary endogenously with population size, after all. Indeed, Proposition 4 establishes that the probability of disagreement is not only strictly less than unity in all equilibria and for all population sizes, it is bounded away from one as the population size goes to infinity. 2 Therefore Proposition 3 has a force that does not fade with increasing population.
Related Literature
One central result in our paper is that minorities may fight more agressively and win. One might think that minorities put up a stronger fight due to a free-rider effect. However, voting is costless in our model, and hence, groups are not subject to the classical freerider problem. Moreover, in the literature on costly voting (Ledyard (1984) , Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and Campbell (1999) ), even when the minority fights harder, the majority still wins more often.
Of these papers, Campbell (1999) is most related to ours. In a costly voting model with two alternatives, this paper studies the following question: can "zealous" minorities win in a majority vote despite their disadvantage in size? Although the focus of this paper is different than ours, one important implication of his results can be contrasted with our findings. When both groups are equally zealous, the unique equilibrium outcome for large electorates involves the minority fighting more aggressively, yet losing the election more often than not.
An important feature of our model is that individuals base their decision on how strongly they prefer one alternative to another. This feature is shared with several papers that investigate different mechanisms in which intensity of preferences determine individual voting behavior. Vote-trading mechanisms, in which voters can trade their votes with one another, have been analyzed in Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and have more recently been revisited by Philipson and Snyder (1996) and Piketty (1994) . Cumulative voting mechanisms in which each voter may allocate a fixed number of votes among a set of candidates has been analyzed as early as in Dodgson (1884) and more recently revisited by Morton and Rietz (1998) and Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) . Finally, Casella (2003) introduces a mechanism of storable votes, in which voters can choose to store votes in order to use them in situations that they feel more strongly about.
The above papers offer new mechanisms of voting and try to determine their normative properties. Our focus is different. Rather than offer a new mechanism, we claim that issues of intensity of preferences exist in many real-life situations of group decisionmaking. Our analysis highlights the importance of consensus and the fear of gridlock as a mechanism through which intensities of preferences are translated into the decision making process. In this context, Ponsati and Sákovicz (1996) is also related to the present paper. Indeed, their model is more ambitious in that they explicitly attempt to study the dynamics of capitulation in an ambient environment similar to that studied here. This leads to a variant on the war of attrition, and their goal is to describe equilibria as differential equations for capitulation times, at which individuals cease to push their favorite alternative.
Our paper is also connected to experimental literature on jury behavior. Several studies performed by Kahneman, Schkade and Sunstein (1998a , 1998b ) on mock juries have arrived at the following conclusions: (1) different juries are likely to reach similar conclusions about the relative severity of different cases, and (2) juries do not produce less erratic and more predictable awards than individuals. Although these studies were performed on cases of punitive damages, rather than criminal cases (where the decision is binary), the above findings can be interpreted in a manner consistent with our results. First, the relative composition of the jury, whether the majority are white, black, poor or rich, does not affect the jury's decision in an unambiguous way. Put differently, a jury may decide on the same punitive damages to a black plaintiff when the majority of jury members are black as well as when the majority are white. Second, if decisions made by juries were more predictable than ones made by individuals, then one would expect that a randomly selected jury will most likely make a decision, which conforms with the views of the majority in the population. Hence, the unpredictablity of jury decisions can be interpreted as multiple equilibria: it is just as likely that the minority will influence the decision of the jury, as it is that the majority will influence its decision.
The Model

The Group Choice Problem
A group of n agents must make a joint choice from a set of two alternatives, which we denote by A and B. The rules of choice are described as follows:
[1] Each agent must either name an alternative -A or B -or she can declare "neutrality", in that she agrees to be counted, in principle, for either side.
[2] If the total number of votes for an alternative plus the number of neutral votes is no less than some exogenously given supermajority m (> n/2), then we shall call that alternative eligible.
[3] If no alternative is eligible, no alternative is chosen: a state D (for "disagreement") is the outcome.
[4] If a single alternative is eligible, then that alternative is chosen.
[5] If both alternatives are eligible, A or B are chosen with equal probability.
Valuations
Normalizing the value of disagreement to zero, each individual will have valuations In Section 6 we explore the consequences of dropping the assumption that disagreement is worse than either alternative.
In what follows we shall impose perfect symmetry across the two types except for the probability of being one type or the other, which we permit to depart from 1/2. [The whole idea, after all, is to study majorities and minorities.] 
The Game
First, each player is (privately) informed of her valuation (v A , v B ). Conditional on this information she decides to announce either A or B , or simply remain neutral and agree to be counted in any direction that facilitates agreement. Because an announcement of the opposite alternative (to a player's type) is weakly dominated by a neutral stance, we presume that each player either decides to vote her own type, or to be neutral. 3 The rules in Section 2.1 then determine expected payoffs.
Equilibrium
Cutoffs
Consider a player of a particular type, with valuations (v, v ). Define q ≡ n − m. Notice that our player only has an effect on the outcome of the game (that is, she is pivotal) in the event that there are exactly q other players announcing her favorite outcome. For, suppose there are more than q such announcements, say for A. Then B cannot be eligible, and whether or not A is eligible, our player's announcement cannot change this fact. So our player has no effect on the outcome. Likewise, if there are strictly less than q announcements of A , then B is eligible whether or not A is, and our player's vote (A or neutral) cannot change the status of the latter. Now look at the pivotal events more closely. One case is when there are precisely q announcements in favor of A, and q + 1 or more announcements favoring B. In this case, by staying neutral our agent ensures that B is the only eligible outcome and is therefore chosen. By announcing A she guarantees that neither outcome is eligible, so disagreement ensues. In short, by switching her announcement from neutral to A, our agent creates a personal loss of v .
In the second case, there are q announcements or less in favor of B. In this case, by going neutral our agent ensures that A and B are both eligible, so the outcome is an equiprobable choice of either A or B. On the other hand, by announcing A , our agent guarantees that A is the only eligible outcome. Therefore by switching in this instance from neutral to announcing A, our agent creates a personal gain of v − (v + v )/2.
To summarize, let P + denote the probability of the former pivotal event (q compatriots announcing A , q + 1 or more announcing B) and P − the probability of the latter pivotal event (q compatriots announcing A , q or less announcing B). It must be emphasized that these probabilities are not exogenous. They depend on several factors, but most critically on the strategies followed by the other agents in the group. Very soon we shall look at this dependence more closely, but notice that even at this preliminary stage we can see that our agent must follow a cutoff rule. For announcing A is weakly preferred to neutrality if and only if
u is a well-defined random variable. Then the condition above reduces to
which immediately shows that our agent will follow a cutoff rule using the variable u.
Notice that we include the extreme rules of always announcing neutrality (or always announcing one's favorite action) in the family of cutoff rules. [Simply think of u as a nonnegative extended real.] If a cutoff rule does not conform to one of these two extremes, we shall say that it is interior. By [A.2], the variable u has the same distribution no matter which type we are referring to. We assume [A.3] u is distributed according to the atomless cdf F , with strictly positive density f on (0, ∞).
Symmetric Equilibrium
In this paper, we study symmetric equilibria: those in which individuals of the same type employ identical cutoffs.
Symmetric Cutoffs
Assume, then, that all A-types use the cutoff u A and all B-types use the cutoff u B . We can now construct the probability that a randomly chosen individual will announce A: she must be of type A , which happens with probability p , and she must want to announce A , which happens with probability 1 − F (u A ). Therefore the overall probability of announcing A , which we denote by λ A , is given by
Similarly, the probability that a randomly chosen individual will announce B is given by
With this notation in hand, we can rewrite the cutoff rule (1) more explicitly. First, add P − to both sides to get
Assuming that we are studying this inequality for a person of type A, the right-hand side is the probability that exactly q individuals announce A , while the left-hand side is the joint probability that exactly q individuals announce A and no more than q individuals announce B. With this in mind, we see that the cutoff u A must solve the equation
Likewise, the cutoff u B solves
We will sometimes refer to these cutoffs as "best responses", though it should be clear that u A embodies not just a "response" by an individual but also an equilibrium condition: that this individual response is equal to the cutoff employed by all compatriots of the same type.
A Simple Refinement
At this stage, an issue arises which we would do well to deal with immediately. It is that a symmetric cutoff of ∞ is always a best response for any type to any cutoff employed by the other type, provided that q > 0. This is easy enough to check: if no member in group A is prepared to declare A in any circumstance, then no A-type will find it in her interest to do so as well. This is because (with q > 0) no such individual is ever pivotal.
Hence the "full neutrality cutoff" u = ∞ is always a best response. But it is an unsatisfactory best response. The reason is that if the compatriots of, say, a type-A individual do announce A for a tiny range of very high u-values, it will push an individual type-A person to announce A for a large range of u-values, thus rendering the cutoff u A = ∞ "unstable".
First let us give an intuitive argument for this. Consider an individual of type A , and let us entertain a small perturbation in the strategy of her compatriots: they use a very large cutoff, but not an infinite one. Now, in the event that our agent is pivotal, it must be that her group is very large with high probability, because her compatriots are only participating to a tiny extent, and yet there are q participants in the pivotal case. This means that group A is likely to win (conditional on the pivotal event), and our individual will want to declare A for a large range of her u-values. This shows the "instability" of the cutoff u A = ∞.
This argument has a clean counterpart in the formal analysis. Once we allow for compatriots (say, of type A) to use any interior cutoff u A , we have λ A > 0 , so that (2) reduces to the simpler form
where we're denoting our individual's cutoff by u A as a reminder that we haven't imposed the symmetry condition yet.
If we divide λ B by 1 − λ A , we form the probability that a randomly chosen person announces B conditional on her not announcing A. Let's call this probability π:
With this notation, (4) may be rewritten as
where m , it will be recalled, is the size of the supermajority (n − q in other words). Now imagine that all compatriots have a very large cutoff, so that u A is very big. Then λ A is close to zero, so that π λ B . So, by (5), u A is bounded. This means that the full-neutrality response is not robust to small perturbations away from full neutrality.
These arguments are a fortiori true in the special case of unanimity: q = 0. Indeed, it is easy to check that full neutrality is never a best response in this case, so no robustness arguments need to be invoked.
Note that invoking weak dominance does not rule out full neutrality. To see this consider the profile in which both groups use a cutoff of zero and so are always voting their type. In this case, when a voter of type A is pivotal, he knows for sure that there are more than q declarations of B. Therefore, this voter has a strict incentive to claim neutrality. Note however, that the above profile is the only profile against which neutrality is a strict best response for every type.
Equilibrium Conditions
In summary, then, the arguments of the previous section permit us to rewrite the equilibrium conditions (2) and (3) as follows:
and
where
We dispose immediately of a simple subcase: the situation in which there is simple majority and n is odd, so that q precisely equals (n − 1)/2. The following result applies:
there is a unique equilibrium which involves u
To see why this must be true, consult (6) and (7) . Notice that when q = (n − 1)/2 , it must be that m − 1 = n − q − 1 = q. So the best responses must equal zero no matter what the size of the other group's cutoff. In words, there is no cost to announcing one's favorite outcome in this case. Recall that the only conceivable cost to doing so is that disagreement might result, but in the pivotal case of concern to any player, there are q compatriots announcing the favorite outcome, which means there are no more than n − 1 − q = q opposing announcements. So disagreement is not a possibility.
In the remainder of the paper, then, we concentrate on the case in which a genuine supermajority is called for: While the detailed computations that support these observations are relegated to the Appendix, a few points are to be noted. First, complete neutrality is never a (robust) best response even when members of the other group are always announcing their favorite alternative. The argument for this is closely related to the remarks made in Section 3.2.2 and we shall not repeat them here. On the other hand, "full aggression" -u = 0 -is also never a best response except in the limiting case as the other side tends to complete neutrality. These properties guarantee that every equilibrium (barring those excluded in Section 3.2.2) employs interior cutoffs.
Observation 3 requires some elaboration. It states that at the point where the best response of Group A leaves both sides equally aggressive (so that u A = u B =ū), group B 's best response leads to greater aggression. The majority takes greater comfort from its greater number, and therefore are more secure about being aggressive. There is less scope for disagreement. However, note the emphasized qualification above. As we shall see later, it will turn out to be important. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation. Each response function satisfies observation 2 , and in addition observation 3 tells us that the response function for B lies above that for A at the 45 0 line. We have therefore established the following proposition. Proposition 1 captures an interesting aspect of the "tyranny of the majority". Not only are the majority greater in number (at least stochastically so in this case), they are also more vocal in expressing their opinion. So group outcomes are doubly shifted -in this particular equilibrium -towards the majority view, once through numbers, and once through greater voice. 4 We will call such an equilibrium a majority equilibrium. Figure 1 , which we used in establishing Proposition 1, is drawn from actual computation. We set n = 4, p = 0.4, ν = 1/4, and chose F to be gamma with parameters (3, 4) . Under this specification, there is, indeed, a unique equilibrium and (by Proposition 1) it must be the majority equilibrium.
Further experimentation with these parameters leads to an interesting outcome. When n is increased, the response curves appear to "bend back" and intersect yet again, this time above the 45 0 line (see Figure 2) . A minority equilibrium (in which u A < u B , so that the minority are more aggressive) makes its appearance. For this example, it does so when there are 12 players.
The bending-back of response curves to generate a minority equilibrium appeared endemic enough in the computations, that we decided to probe further. To do this, we study large populations in which the ratio of q to n is held fixed at ν ∈ (0, 1/2). More precisely, we look at sequences {n, q} growing unboundedly large so that q is one of the (at most) two integers closest to νn. We obtain the following analytical confirmation of the simulations: Proposition 2 Assume that 0 < ν < p ≤ 1/2. Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞ and q is one of the (at most) two integers closest to νn. Then there exists a finite N such that for all n ≥ N , a minority equilibrium must exist.
Several comments are in order. First, if there is a minority equilibrium, there must be at least two of them, because of the end point restrictions implied by Observations 2 and 3. Some of these equilibria will suffer from stability concerns similar to those discussed in Section 3.2.2. But there will always be other minority equilibria that are "robust" in this sense. 5 Second, it might be felt that the threshold N described in Proposition 2 may be too large for "reasonable" group sizes. Our simulations reveal that this is not true. For instance, within the exponential class of valuation distributions, the threshold at which a minority equilibrium appears is typically around N = 10 or thereabouts, which is by no means a large number.
Third, the qualification that ν > 0 is important. The unanimity case, with q = 0 is delicate. We return to this issue in Section 6. The case p ≤ ν , which we also treat in Section 6 , is of interest as well.
Finally, as an aside, note that Proposition 2 covers the symmetric case p = 1/2 , in which case the content of the proposition is that an asymmetric equilibrium exists (for large n). To be sure, the proposition is far stronger than this assertion, which would only imply (by continuity) that a minority equilibrium exists (with large n) if p is sufficiently close to 1/2.
We can provide some intuition as to why minority existence is guaranteed for large n but not so for small n. Observe that when n is "small", there are two sorts of uncertainties that plague any player. She does not know how many people there are of her type, and she is uncertain about the realized distribution of valuations. Both these uncertainties are troublesome in that they may precipitate costly disagreement. The possibility of disagreement is lowered by more and more people adopting a neutral stance, though after a point it will be lowered sufficiently so that it pays individuals to step in and announce their favorite outcome. For a member of the stochastic majority, this point will be reached earlier, and so a majority equilibrium will always exist.
On the other hand, when n is large, these uncertainties go away or at any rate are reduced. Now the expectation that the minority will be aggressive can be credibly self-fulfilling, because the expectation of an aggressive strategy can be more readily transformed into the expectation of a winning outcome.
However, as already discussed in the Introduction, this intuition is not enough. Section 6 has more to say on the matter.
Finally, compare and contrast this finding with the asymmetric equilibria in the Battle of the Sexes. Recall that analogues of those equilibria exist in this model as well, but they have already been eliminated by the refinement introduced in Section 3.2.2. The equilibria here, while driven by similar intuitive considerations, are not the same objects (indeed, minority equilibria don't always exist, as noted already). By permitting different and heterogeneous valuations, as well as different group sizes, we obtain a more nuanced description of when the double equilibrium actually comes into being.
Minorities Win in Minority Equilibrium
In this section we address the distinction between an equilibrium in which one group behaves more aggressively, and one in which that group wins more often. For instance, in the majority equilibrium the majority fights harder and wins more often than the minority does. [It cannot be otherwise, the majority are ahead both in numbers and aggression.] But there is no reason to believe that the same is true of the minority equilibrium. The minority may be more aggressive, but the numbers are not on their side.
However, a remarkable property of this model is that a minority equilibrium must involve the minority winning with greater probability than the majority. Provided that a minority equilibrium exists, aggression must compensate for numbers.
Proposition 3 In a minority equilibrium, the minority outcome is implemented with greater probability than the majority outcome.
This framework therefore indicates quite clearly how group behavior in a given situation may be swayed both by majority and minority concerns. When the latter occurs, it turns out that we have some kind of "tyranny of the minority": they are so vocal that they actually swing outcomes (in expectation) to their side.
The proof of this proposition is so simple that we provide it in the main text, in the hope that it will serve as its own intuition.
Proof. Recall (6) and (7) and note that u A < u B in a minority equilibrium. It follows right away that
Expanding this inequality, we conclude that λ B (1−λ B ) < λ A (1−λ A ). Because λ A < 1/2 , this can only happen in two ways: either λ B > 1 − λ A , or λ B < λ A . The former case is impossible, because λ A and λ B describe mutually exclusive events, so the latter case must obtain. But this implies the truth of the proposition.
The Probability of Disagreement
In the previous section we established the existence of a minority equilibrium. However, existence was guaranteed only for large n. Hence, for proposition 3 to have bite it must be the case that for large n , the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one. Our next proposition proves exactly that.
Proposition 4 Assume that
0 < ν < 1 2 .
Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞ and q is one of the (at most) two integers closest to νn. Then the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one.
The intuition for this result is the following. Suppose that the probability of disagreement is high. Then the probability that each group is blocking the supermajority of its rival is also high. In particular, this means that group cutoffs are not wandering off to infinity. On the other hand, we can see that if group A , for example, is blocking group B , then the latter will be discouraged from making a B announcement. Doing so will most likely lead to disagreement, while casting a neutral vote ensures an agreement on A. This argument makes for high cutoffs, a contradiction to the bounded group cutoffs that were asserted earlier in this paragraph.
In part, the formalization of the above intuition is easy, but the simultaneous movements in population size and cutoffs necessitate a subtle argument. In particular, the last implication -that cutoffs become large with population size -rests on arguments regarding rates of change as a function of population. The reader is referred to the formal proof for details.
What allows individuals to agree, even when there are great many of them, is the option to remain neutral. This can be seen if we analyze a restricted version of our model in which individuals have only two options: A or B. We carry out this analysis in Section 6.1. There, we show that Proposition 4 ceases to hold.
Finally, note that the case of unanimity is not covered by Proposition 4. Just like the counterpart of Proposition 3 involving unanimity, this question remains open.
Extensions
No Neutrality
In our opinion, when faced with impending disagreement, the option of a neutral stance is very natural. This is why we adopted this specification in our basic model. [As discussed already, neutrality is not to be literally interpreted as a formal announcement.] Nevertheless, it would be useful to see if the insights of the exercise are broadly preserved if announcements are restricted to be either A or B.
We can quickly sketch such a model. An individual is now pivotal under two circumstances. In the first event, the number of people announcing her favorite outcome is exactly q , which we assume to be less than (n − 1)/2. 6 By announcing her favorite, then, disagreement is the outcome, while an announcement of the other alternative would lead to that alternative being implemented. The loss, then, from voting one's favorite in this event is precisely v (recall that the disagreement payoff is normalized to zero). In the second event, the number of people announcing the alternative is exactly q. By announcing her favorite, she guarantees its implementation, while the other announcement would lead to disagreement. So the gain from voting one's favorite in this event is v. Consequently, an individual will announce her favorite if Pr(exactly q others vote for alternative)v ≥ Pr(exactly q others vote for favorite)v .
Define w ≡ v/v . Then equilibrium cutoffs w A and w B are given by the conditions
where |A| and |B| stand for the number of A-and B-announcements out of n−1 individuals, and where equality must hold in each of the conditions provided the corresponding cutoff strictly exceeds 1, which is the lower bound for these variables. In this variation of the model, it is obvious that at least one group must be "fully aggressive" (i.e., its cutoff must equal one). 7 Moreover, as long as we are in the case q < (n − 1)/2, both groups cannot simultaneously be "fully aggressive": one of the cutoffs must strictly exceed unity.
So, in contrast to our model, in which all (robust) equilibria are fully interior, the equilibria here are at "corners" (full aggression on one side, full acquiescence on the other) or "semi-corners" (full aggression on one side, interior cutoffs on the other). The semi-corner equilibria are always robust in the sense of Section 3.2.2 , and we focus on these in what follows. 8 In particular, to examine possible minority equilibria, set w A = 1. Then use the equality version of (9) to assert that
n−1−2q (10) in any such equilibrium, where H is the (assumed atomless) cdf of w , distributed on its full support [1, ∞) . It is easy to use (10) to deduce Observation 4 [1] A semi-corner minority equilibrium exists if (n, q) are sufficiently large. [2] In any minority equilibrium, the minority outcome is implemented with greater probability than the majority outcome.
So the broad contours of our model can be replicated in this special case. This is reassuring, because it reassures us of the robustness of the results. At the same time this variation allows us to highlight the main implication of allowing voters to remain neutral: absent neutrality voters may be locked into situations in which they are almost certain to disagree. This is formalized in the next result.
Observation 5 Assume 0 < ν < p < 1 2 . Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞ and q is one of the two integers closest to νn. Then there exists a sequence of semi-corner minority equilibria for which the probability of disagreement coverges to one.
The above result demonstrates the importance of being neutral: neutrality allows the players to avoid disagreement. Recall that Proposition 4 establishes that with neutrality, the probability of disagreement at every interior equilibrium is bounded away from one. Once the option of neutrality is taken away, the probability that players reach a disagreement (at any interior equilibrium) must go to one along some sequence of minority equilibria.
Supermajority Requirements and Minority Equilibrium
Up to this point we have focused on group size as a determinant of the existence of minority equilibria. A related question is whether existence is affected by variations in the supermajority rule.
Common intuition suggests that a higher supermajority requirement facilitates the emergence of a minority equilibrium. Indeed, the comparative politics literature compares different political systems and motivates what has been termed "consensus systems" (Lijphart (1999) ) by the desire to protect minorities from the tyrany of the majority.
Our model allows us to investigate the hypothesis discussed above. We have already shown that when the supermajority is relatively high (i.e., m n > 1 − p), the existence of minority equilibria is guaranteed for large n. The question is, whether the minority can get its way when the supermajority requirement is relaxed. This is the subject of our next proposition. Taken together, Propositions 2 and 5 may suggest a monotonic relation between the supermajority requirement and the "power" of the minority. However, it is not clear whether this is true in our model. To see why, consider an individual of type A and her best response condition. Holding B 's cutoff fixed, as q decreases, A 's cutoff increases, i.e., the group fights less aggressively. This follows from the fact that as q decreases, the probability, that the B-types would block A from being chosen, increases. Because the above effect of lowering q applies to both groups, it is not clear which group benefits from this change.
To demonstrate the ambiguous effect of lowering q consider the following example: let n = 1, 000 (in light of Proposition 3 we intentionally pick a large n), p = 0.4 and consider the distribution function
. For q = 300 there exists a minority equilibrium u A 1.35 and u B 80. However, for q = 10 there exists no minority equilibrium.
The above example seems to suggest that for some distribution functions a minority equilibrium may not exist when the supermajority requirement is close to unanimity.
Conjecture 1 Suppose m = n. There exists a family of distribution functions for which a minority equilibrium does not exist for any n.
Known Group Size
In this section we comment on the implications of uncertainty regarding the size of one's group. For this purpose, we modify our model by assuming that it is common knowledge that there are n A individuals of type A and n B > n A individuals of type B. We retain all our other assumptions.
The first observation we make is that our arguments in Section 3.2.2 do not apply to this new model. To see why, consider the case when all B types are voting for B , whereas only extreme A-types are voting for A. When an A-type knows exactly how many B-types there are, he realizes that he can only create a disagreement by voting for A. Therefore, when group sizes are known, the two corner equilibria are robust (in the sense of Section 3.2.2). This suggests that the corner equilibria are unnatural in the following sense: when faced with some uncertainty about group sizes, some individuals may still put up a fight.
Our second observation relates to the importance of group size in the emergence of minority equilibria. Potentially, the existence of minority equilibria in our original model may be due to two types of uncertainties that are relaxed in large groups. First, as the number of individuals in the group increases, voters have a more accurate estimate of the proportion of their types in the group. Second, as the population increases, each individual has a better picture of the distribution of intensities among his compatriots.
What if group sizes are known? Then it can easily be shown that the equilibrium cutoff for one type depend only on the equilbrium cutoff of the other type. More precisely, an equilibrium (u A , u B ) satisfies the following equations,
where n A < n B are the number of individuals of type A and B respectively. It is straightforward to construct examples in which there does not exist a minority equilibrium for small n A and n B . For instance, take
, n A = 2, n B = 3 and q = 1. For these values there exists a unique interior majority equilibrium, u A ≈ 250 and u B ≈ 0.22. However, using arguments similar to those employed in Proposition 2 and 4, one can show that for large n a minority equilibrium exists and the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one. By simple stochastic dominance arguments, it can be shown that in any minority equilbrium the minority wins more often.
We conclude that certainty regarding the numbers of A and B types is not sufficient to generate a minority equilibrium; even when the numbers of A and B types are known, we still need n to be sufficiently large for the minority to prevail.
Types who prefer disagreement to the rival alternative
Suppose there exist types who rank disagreement above their second best alternative. Clearly, voting for the preferred alternative is weakly dominant for these types. Hence, in any interior equilibrium these individuals would vote their type. In this sense, incorporating these voters into our model is equivalent to adding aggregate noise. We believe that if the proportion of such types is sufficiently low, all of our results continue to hold.
Summary
We study a model of group decision-making in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers some alternative to disagreement.
We uncover a variant on the "tyranny of the majority": there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under very general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. This equilibrium displays a "tyranny of the minority": it is always true that the increased aggression of the minority more than compensates for smaller number, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative.
These equilibria are not to be confused with "corner" outcomes in which a simple failure of coordination allows any one group to be fully aggressive and another to be completely timid, without regard to group size. Indeed, one innovation of this paper is to show how such equilibria are entirely non-robust when confronted with varying intensities of valuations, and some amount of uncertainty regarding such valuations.
[In fact, as we emphasize in the paper, minority equilibria don't always exist, in sharp contrast to the non-robust corner equilibria, which always do.]
Apart from uncertainty and varying valuation intensities, the option for a player to remain neutral plays a crucial role in this paper. In all cases, the neutrality option ensures that the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one (as group size changes), regardless of the supermajority value needed for agreement, as long as it is not unanimity. Apart from being of some intrinsic interest, this proposition also shows that the "minority wins" result does not occur in unimportant contexts in which there is widespread disagreement anyway. 
Consequently, recalling (6) and noting that q < (n − 1)/2 , we see that α(u A , u B ) converges to a number strictly less than one as u A → 0 , while it becomes unboundedly large as u A → ∞. By continuity, then, there exists some u A such that α(u A , u B ) = 1, establishing the existence of a cutoff. To show uniqueness, it suffices to verify that α is strictly increasing in u A . Because the expression
it will suffice to show that π itself is declining in u A , which is a matter of simple inspection.
To show that the response u A strictly decreases in u B , it will therefore be enough to establish that α is also increasing in u B . Just as in the previous paragraph, we do this by showing that π is decreasing in u B , which again is a matter of elementary inspection.
Finally, we observe that u A ↓ 0 as u B ↑ ∞. Note that along such a sequence, π → 0 regardless of the behavior of u A . Consequently,
To maintain the equality (6), therefore, it must be the case that u A ↓ 0.
Of course, all these arguments hold if we switch A and B.
Proof of Observation 3. Letū be defined as in the statement of this Observation. Definē
whereπ ≡λ B /(1 −λ A ). Now recall that σ in (7) is defined by σ =
, so that if we consider the corresponding valueσ defined by setting u A = u B =ū , we see that
But λ A ≤ 1/2 (because p ≤ 1/2), so that the second inequality above holds if and only if λ A ≤λ B , and this last condition follows simply from the fact that p ≤ 1/2.
So we have established thatσ ≤π. It follows that
and using this information in (11), we must conclude that
Recalling that β is increasing in its first argument (see proof of Observation 2), it follows from (12) that type B 's best response toū is no bigger thanū. Finally, observe that all these arguments apply with strict inequality when p < 1/2. Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any sequence {n, q} as described in the statement of the proposition. Because p > ν , there exists a cutoffū A > 0 and a finite n * such that for all n ≥ n * ,λ
Note that there is also an associated sequence {m} defined by m ≡ n − q. We break the proof up into several steps.
Step 1. We claim that there exists an integer M such that for each m ≥ M there is u m B < ∞ that solves the following equation:
for all n ≥ n * . Consequently, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN),
as m and q grow to infinity. It follows that there exists M such that for all m ≥ M (and associated q),
For such m , provisionally consider u m B = 0. Then λ
, and using this in (13), we conclude that
Combining this information with (15), we see that if u m B = 0, then 
Combining (16) and (17) and noting that the LHS of (14) is continuous in u m B , it follows that for all m ≥ M there exists 0 < u m B < ∞ such that the claim is true.
Step 2. One implication of (14) 
To see why, note that 1 1+ū A ∈ (0, 1). Using (14) and SLLN, it must be that π m → ν/(1−ν) ∈ (0, 1) as (m, q) → ∞. Recalling the definition of π m it follows right away that u m B must be bounded.
Step 3. Next, we claim there exists an integer M * such that
To establish this claim, note first, using (13) , that
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that p ∈ 0, 1 2 , so that
A simple rearrangement of this inequality shows that
Now suppose, contrary to the claim, that u m B ≤ū A along some subsequence of m. Then on that subsequence,
Combining (20) and (21), we may conclude that along the subsequence of m for which
which contradicts (18) of Step 2.
To prepare for the next step, letû m B denote the best response of the B-types to u A =ū A . That is,
Step 2 the probability of disagreement is zero). Note that the probability of disagreement is equal to Pr(|A| > q, |B| > q), where |.| stands for cardinality. Because
it suffices to show that Pr(A > q) and Pr(B > q) cannot both converge to one along some subsequence of n.
Suppose, on the contrary, that Pr(A > q) = 1 and Pr(B > q) = 1 does converge to one along some subsequence of n (retain notation). The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step we show that for large n both λ A and λ B are strictly above ν. Moreover, if either λ A or λ B converges to ν , then it converges at a rate slower than
In the second step we show that this implies that the equilibrium cutoffs, u A and u B , must be growing to infinity, in contradiction to step 1.
Step 1. lim n→∞
We prove lim n→∞
Assume to the contrary that there exists a subsequence for which lim n→∞
Let X n denote the number of A announcements (i.e., |A|). By the Berry-Esséen Theorem (see, for example, Feller (1986, Chapter XVI.5, Theorem 1)), for some ε < Φ(−c), there exists an N such that for n > N
and this contradicts our premise that lim n→∞ Pr(|A| > q) = 1.
Recalling that π = 
where the last inequality is by Chebyshev's inequality and the limit follows from the premise. Therefore, by (6) it must be that u A → ∞. This implies that λ A → 0 , in contradiction to step 1.
Proof of Observation 4.
To prove part [1] , define δ ≡ 1/(n − 1 − 2q), and rewrite (9) as
Notice that when w B = 1, the LHS of (24) equals 2, while the RHS is strictly smaller than 2 (because p < 1/2). Now suppose that there is some w such that the LHS of (24), evaluated at w B = w , is strictly less than 1/(1 − p). In this case, consider some intersection x = w B of the function (1 + x δ ) [1 − H(x) ] with the value 1/(1 − p), along with the value w A = 1. It can be verified that such an intersection constitutes a semi-corner minority equilibrium.
It remains to show that the condition in the first line in the previous paragraph is satisfied for all (n, q) large enough. To this end, fix some w such that 1−H(w) < 1/2(1−p). Now take (n, q) to infinity and notice that δ → 0. Therefore w δ converges to 1. It follows that for large (n, q),
and we are done.
Note that part [2] is trivially true for corner minority equilibria. To prove part [2] for semi-corners, note that the probability that the minority outcome is implemented is given by Notice that w * B is well-defined and greater than 1, as long as p < 1/2. We now proceed in two steps.
Step 1. There exists a sequence of semi-corner minority equilibria that converges to (1, w * B ). To see this, note that when w B = w * B the RHS of (10) such that for all n ≥ N (ε), the LHS of (10) is strictly greater than its RHS. It follows that for all n ≥ N (ε), there exists an equilibrium (1, w n B ) where w n B ∈ (w * B , w * B + ε).
Step 2. By Step 1, as n → ∞, the probabilities with which a random voter votes for A or for B (along the above sequence of semi-corner minority equilibria) both converge to 1/2. In particular, there exists an N above which these probabilities are bounded below byν > ν and above by 1 −ν. The probability of disagreement is equal to 1 − Pr (|A| ≥ m) − Pr (|B| ≥ m). We now show that Pr (|A| ≥ m) goes to zero as n → ∞. By essentially the same argument, Pr (|B| ≥ m) also goes to zero as n → ∞.
Recall that 
By inequality (26) and the SLLN, the RHS of (27) goes to zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose on the contrary that a minority equilibrium (u n A , u n B ) exists along some subsequence of n (all references that follow are to this subsequence). Then lim n→∞ (u n A , u n B ) is either (∞, ∞), (0, ∞) or a pair of strictly positive but finite numbers (u * A , u * B ). To prove that our supposition is wrong, we show that none of these limits can apply.
Assume (6) and (7 , it follows that π n and σ n must both converge to 
